Will Modi play the great game?

The last outpost of the Raj still survives in South Block

It was joked in 1881 when Tsarist Russia captured the town of Merv in Turkmenistan that the governor- general in Calcutta became ‘mervous’. Another little-known detail of history that should interest Mr Narendra Modi in view of the guest list at his inaugural ceremony is that the Cripps’ Mission proposed in 1945 that independent India should accept responsibility for defending the ‘South-east Asia area’.

Britain’s humiliation by Japan during World War II was the obvious inspiration. But someone with a historical perspective in Attlee’s Cabinet may have reasoned that if Rajendra Chola could cross the Bay of Bengal in the eleventh century, destroy the Sri Vijaya empire in Sumatra and conquer Malaya, some interloper could perform the operation in reverse.

Both highlighted—like Mr Modi’s astute overtures to SAARC leaders—the importance of the Near Abroad concept. It’s a Russian term that is also translated as ‘sphere of influence’, and is best illustrated with the humdrum example of Kolkata’s Fort William. There was an older Fort William in BBD Bagh roughly where Kolkata’s General Post Office now stands. It was a congested area then, with houses extending cheek by jowl right up to the ramparts. Siraj-ud-Daulah’s soldiers merely moved from one house to another during the night of 20 June 1756 until they reached Fort William, which they captured.

So, when the British built a new fort, they gave it what is called a glacis, an open surrounding space which exposes attackers to the defenders’ missiles. It’s three kilometres from north to south, and a kilometre wide.

The archaic concept of a fort’s protective glacis becomes the Near Abroad when applied to a country. The Russians, who regard 14 neighbouring states, all former Soviet republics, as essential to their security, are alarmed that Ukraine’s agreement with the European Union will bring in NATO and lead to the Russian Federation being militarily encircled. Even without that threat, Moscow fears that Ukraine’s close integration with the EU will flood Russia with cheap imports and affect oil and natural gas supplies.

Britain is fortunate in being blest with a natural glacis. The sea, its best defence down the ages, is regarded as such an exclusively British possession that one severe winter when the English Channel became a bed of ice, The Times famously proclaimed, ‘Channel frozen, Europe isolated’.

American President James Monroe’s warning to European colonial powers not to try and re-establish control over newly- independent Latin American nations is probably the most effective articulation of the Near Abroad concept. Most Latin Americans deeply resented the policy which they thought replaced Spanish, Portuguese or French imperialism by American. India has two lessons to learn from the American experience. First, a cooperative relationship with the region’s smaller countries cannot be forced on them. It must be a willing partnership. Second, there can be no cooperation in the Near Abroad without prosperity at home. A vigorous economy is the best guarantee of innovative diplomacy abroad.

The Cuban missile crisis was probably the best known exposition of the Monroe Doctrine. Lately, the United States has extended the doctrine to warn off rival forces in Europe and Asia. President Barack Obama’s Asian pivot makes China and North Korea part of America’s Near Abroad. The United States has a similar interest in South-east Asia. Iraq and Afghanistan are shattered because of American intervention. The Taliban owe their existence to American funding of the Mujahideen.

India’s regional concerns are rarely spelt out. Theories are not in our culture. One of the few exceptions was Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee’s letter to President Bill Clinton after Pokhran II. But Mr Modi’s visit to Bhutan and swearing-in ceremony as Prime Minister provided more eloquent testimony than any formulation could have done. The inclusion of the prime minister of Mauritius defined his understanding of India’s regional role. Perhaps Fiji, the Seychelles and even Madagascar could have been included.

The British Raj’s interpretation of India’s glacis included much of Central Asia, Tibet and the Himalayan states. What Kipling called the Great Game was all about India’s security. Russia sought an opening to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. To get to it, the Russians had to pass through Central Asia, Afghanistan and today’s Pakistan. Central Asia was already passing into Russian control with the capture of towns like Merv. The territory that now comprises Pakistan was firmly under the British. There remained only Afghanistan over which the British and Russians plotted and conspired and squabbled and fought proxy wars. Securing Afghanistan was regarded as essential for India’s security.

It’s much the same today. Remember, Mr Hamid Karzai was also at Mr Modi’s swearing- in. Afghanistan is a bone of contention because it is the Near Abroad for many countries. It’s the scene of India-Pakistan manoeuvres. It’s Russia’s glacis as it is Iran’s. The United States also regards Afghanistan as its Near Abroad because American strategic interests are not confined by geography.

Today’s oil-rich Gulf kingdoms were administered from Delhi. Iraq was a district of the Bombay Presidency. Singapore was part of Bengal. A senior officer at the Staff College at Wellington put it nicely. Nineteenth century British Indian foreign policy, he said, was based on three pivots. First, to hold India. Second, to hold the sealanes to India. Third, the conviction that God was an Englishman.

We’ll leave the British to their little fancy although we know of course that God is Indian. The imperative to hold India calls for no elucidation. It’s the sea lanes that highlight the importance the British Raj attached to India’s glacis. Memories of that grand territorial spread linger. When he wrote that the last Englishman would be an Indian, Malcolm Muggeridge, the British writer who worked on The Statesman in Calcutta in the 1930s, might have added that the last outpost of the Raj survives in South Block. That was evident at the Bandung Conference. Jawaharlal Nehru didn’t like something in the speech that Sir John Kotelawala, the Ceylon prime minister, made. “Why didn’t you show me your speech first?” Nehru asked imperiously. “Why should I?” Kotelawala retorted. “Do you show me yours?”

Albert Rene, president of the Seychelles (1977-2004), put his finger on India’s dilemma when he called it “the awkward grandfather of the region”. In his words, “India would like to play a big role, but it has a complex, that people will say they’re imperialistic.” Not for nothing did Sri Lankans call a former Indian high commissioner the ‘Viceroy’.

The near abroad can be defined in many ways. Geopolitical security is the obvious basis. China speaks of ‘core interests’. But they haven’t always asserted their Near Abroad claims only through force of arms. The Kuomintang regime of General Chiang Kai-shek—known in the West as ‘General Cash-my- cheque’—encouraged Chinese soldiers to marry Vietnamese brides, expecting their bilingual children to uphold China’s position as Vietnam’s protector.

Iran sees itself as protector of adjoining Iraq’s Shia community. Syria has a similar interest in Lebanon. Today’s Russia claims a stake in lands with ethnic Russian inhabitants. Tsarist Russia’s protective role for Orthodox Christians was one of the causes of World War I. India’s actions in Mauritius (and to an extent) Sri Lanka are inspired by ethnic and religious ties.

India has several times intervened in small neighbouring countries. Some interventions like Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka have been disastrous. Some like Operation Lal Dora in Mauritius had to be aborted. But Operation Cactus in the Maldives moved Reagan to applause and prompted Margaret Thatcher’s exclamation “Thank God for India!”

Usually, India is mealy-mouthed about such actions, as Rene observed. Admiral RH Tahiliani is one of the few unashamed exponents of an interventionist role. “We must take the responsibility that size imposes,” he said, “without having any hegemonistic aspirations. Coming to the help of a small neighbour is a responsibility, but we have no intention of spreading our sphere of influence.”

There’s a contradiction there. Intervention is itself an act of influence. It can only be performed by a superior power capable of dominating smaller nations. This is where Mr Modi’s advisors must exercise caution. The recent claim by China’s president, Xi Jinping, that “no country should seek absolute security for itself at the expense of others” may be dismissed as hyperbole. But two points must be stressed. First, security is not synonymous with acquisition. Second, while no country can afford to overlook threats in its Near Abroad, ultimate security lies at home.

The answers lie in managing smaller surrounding peoples without making them feel they are subjects, in winning hearts and minds, not controlling actions. It’s even more necessary to guarantee the basic means of livelihood to every citizen at home. The Near Abroad strategy is most effective when accompanied by dynamic economic growth. Let India never again give cause to a newspaper to write—as The Hindustan Times did on 30 August 1974, ‘Perhaps there is no need for the common man to ask for bread. He’s getting Sikkim.’ Adequate bread for all is the ultimate security.

About The Author

Sunanda K Datta-Ray

Sunanda K Datta-Ray is a journalist and author of several books. He is an Open contributor