India: 25 Years as a Nuclear Weapon State

I witnessed two prime ministerial visits to the US in 1994 and 2000. The first was the visit of Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao and the second was the visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The difference between the two was in the way the US media covered the two visits. Rao was in the US for several days, spoke at the UN and had important meetings in Washington with President Bill Clinton. It resulted in the formulation of a new relationship, marking the end of the Cold War and emergence of the US as the only pole that made the world go round. India moved away from its nonaligned rhetoric on many issues and Rao came away with the impression that there was even a new understanding on India’s nuclear policy. But not a word appeared in the US media except when a hotel in Boston, where Rao stayed, sent away its Pakistani employees on leave during the period for fear that they might poison the Indian prime minister.

In contrast, the arrival of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Washington in December 2000 was a media event. All his engagements were reported on the front pages of newspapers and mainstream media was following his every move. The reason was simple. India had become a declared nuclear weapon power on May 11, 1998, a change that angered the Americans, but also made them realise that they had to deal with a new India. In the next 10 years that followed, the US used every trick in the book to put the Indian nuclear genii back in the bottle.

The US reaction to the nuclear tests of May 1998 was ballistic. More than the tests themselves, the US was offended by the fact that neither the CIA nor the State Department had any inkling of the tests until an announcement was made. Right from the moment the Vajpayee government was formed, the US kept enquiring in Washington and Delhi as to what the plan was to implement the promise in the party manifesto to “review nuclear policy”. No one gave a direct answer to the question, but gave the impression that it would be a long process. The foreign secretary, who was in Washington for bilateral consultations, was particularly reticent on the issue. President Clinton sent a special envoy to the Indian prime minister to seek information about India’s nuclear plans. Vajpayee gave him an enigmatic smile which was interpreted as an assurance that nothing was likely to happen in a hurry. And the explosions took place within days.

The next two months were the most difficult times in the history of India-US relations. Ambassador Naresh Chandra and I met our counterparts several times, but the line taken by them was that India had betrayed the cause of non-proliferation and the next step was only to determine the nature of the punishment to be meted out to us. The Glen Amendment, which called for comprehensive sanctions against any country violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), was applied and the sanctions prohibited trade, banking, travel and communications. Many nuclear and scientific entities were blacklisted and nothing characterised as dual-use materials could be purchased even from the market. We met as many senators and Congressmen as possible to explain the rationale of the tests, but most of them felt that “India had shot itself not only on its foot, but also on its head,” as remarked by Senator Jesse Helms.

The ice began to melt when talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott began the most comprehensive dialogue on security issues in July 1998. American senators and Congressmen began to notice loss of business in their constituencies on account of the sanctions, and began to move amendments in the Congress to relax the sanctions. No agreements were signed during the talks, but by the end of 1999, the ground was prepared for President Clinton’s visit, which was postponed on account of the tests. The visit of Clinton and a follow-up visit by Vajpayee transformed the relationship and the stage was set for the nuclear deal which was negotiated by the Manmohan Singh government. India became a technologically advanced responsible partner in nuclear and scientific development and a waiver of the controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group opened up for India to engage in nuclear trade with any country. But the promise of full cooperation on nuclear matters never materialised. While access to nuclear materials was ensured by making India exempt from the restrictions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the US itself did not open nuclear trade with India. India’s new law relating to liability in the case of accidents became a hurdle and no formula was found to overcome it. India continued to remain outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group as India had not signed the NPT. The Fukushima accident and the widespread protests in India against foreign reactors also contributed to the difficulties in importing reactors. The expectation of substantial increase in the production of nuclear energy was not met and India opted for increase of indigenous reactors and pursuit of the thorium option.

India has signed civil nuclear agreements with Argentina, Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Russia, South Korea, the UK, the US, Vietnam, Mongolia and Namibia. Agreements to set up nuclear reactors were signed with the US and France. But various technical hurdles on our NPT status prevented the construction of these reactors. The Russian reactors in Kudankulam remain the only foreign reactors operating on Indian soil, though continued supply of fuel from other countries has been ensured.

India had envisaged to increase the contribution of nuclear power to overall electricity generation fuel capacity from 2.8 per cent to 9 per cent within 25 years. By 2020, India’s installed nuclear power generation capacity was expected to increase to 20GW, but it appears that the capacity will not exceed 7GW in the near future.

India as a nuclear weapon state after 25 years has been recognised as a responsible state with a strong deterrent capability and a commitment to disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although it did not lead to a satisfactory nuclear generation capacity, the nuclear deal has removed certain anxieties about India and led to better India-US relations and global nuclear cooperation.

About The Author

TP Sreenivasan

TP Sreenivasan is a former diplomat

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